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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure
broadcasting over block-fading channels with limited channel
knowledge at the transmitter. More particularly, we analyze
the effect of having imperfect channel state information (CSI)
via a finite rate feedback on the throughput of a broadcast
channel where the transmission is intended for multiple legitimate
receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper. Indeed, we consider
that the transmitter is only provided by a b-bits feedback of
the main channel state information (CSI). The feedback bits
are sent by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of each
fading block, over error-free public links with limited capacity.
Also, we assume that the transmitter is aware of the statistics
of the eavesdropper’s CSI but not of its channel’s realizations.
Assuming an average transmit power constraint, we establish
upper and lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity. We
consider both the common message transmission case, where the
source broadcasts the same information to all the receivers, and
the independent messages case, where the transmitter broadcasts
multiple independent messages to the legitimate receivers. In both
scenarios, we show that the proposed lower and upper bounds
coincide asymptotically as the capacity of the feedback links
become large, i.e. b → ∞; hence, fully characterizing the secrecy
capacity in this case.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent concerns of wireless communi-
cation systems is to ensure the security of the users against
eavesdropping attacks. In last years, wireless physical layer
security has gained a lot of attention from the research com-
munity. Compared to the traditional cryptographic techniques,
physical layer security is performed with less complexity and
is more convenient for the emerging ad-hoc and decentralized
networks and the next wave of innovative systems known as
the Internet of Things. The information theoretic security was
firstly introduced by Shannon in [1]. Many years later, Wyner
proposed a new model for the wiretap channel [2]. In his
seminal work, Wyner presented the degraded wiretap channel,
where a source exploits the structure of the medium channel
to transmit a message reliably to the intended receiver while
leaking asymptotically no information to the eavesdropper.
Ulterior works generalized Wyner’s work to the case of non-
degraded channels [3], Gaussian channels [4], and fading
channels [5], [6].
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Recent research interest has been given to analyzing the
secrecy capacity of multi-users systems. For the broadcast
multi-users scenario, the secrecy capacity of parallel and
fading channels, assuming perfect main CSI at the transmitter,
was considered in [7] and [8]. The case of imperfect main
channel estimation was elaborated in [9]. For the multiple
access scenario, the authors in [10] and [11] investigated the
secrecy capacity of degraded wiretap channels. The problem
of analyzing the secrecy capacity of multiple antenna systems
has also been of great interest. The secrecy capacity for the
multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap Gaussian channel
was proven in [12] and [13]. Another work [14] characterized
the secrecy capacity for the MISO case, with a multiple-
antenna eavesdropper, when the main and the eavesdropping
channels are known to all terminals. The secrecy capacity of
the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmission with
a multiple-antenna eavesdropper was considered in [15] and
[16] when the channel matrices are fixed and known to all
terminals. The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO
broadcast wiretap channel was derived in [17].
Taking full advantage of the ability of the physical layer to
secure wireless transmissions, requires a complete knowledge
of the channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter
(CSIT); which is difficult to have in practical scenarios. One
way to overcome this challenge is by using feedback [18],
[19]. This is a natural setting as CSI feedback is incorporated
in most if not all communication standards. For the case
of a single user transmission, an upper and a lower bounds
on the secrecy capacity were presented, in [20], for block-
fading channels with finite rate feedback. For the MIMO
case, the work in [21] and [22] evaluated the impact of
quantized channel information on the achievable secrecy rate,
for multiple-antenna wiretap channels, using artificial noise.
In this paper, we investigate the ergodic secrecy capacity of
a broadcast wiretap channel where a source transmits to multi-
ple legitimate receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper. In
particular, we analyze the case of block-fading channels with
limited CSI feedback. More specifically, we consider that the
transmitter is unaware of the channel gains to the legitimate
receivers and to the eavesdropper and is only provided a
finite CSI feedback. This feedback is sent by the legitimate
receivers through error-free links with limited capacity. Both
the common message transmission, where the same message is
broadcasted to all the legitimate receivers, and the independent
messages transmission, where the source broadcasts multiple
independent messages, are considered. Assuming an average
power constraint at the transmitter, we provide an upper and a
lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity for the common
message case, and an upper and a lower bounds on the secrecy
sum-rate for the independent messages case. For the particular
case of infinite feedback, we prove that our bounds coincide.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
system model. The main results along with the corresponding
proofs are introduced in section III for the common message
transmission and in section IV for the independent messages
case. Finally, selected simulation results are presented in
section V, while section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: Throughout the paper, we use the following
notational conventions. The expectation operation is denoted
by E[.], the modulus of a scalar x is expressed as |x|, and we
define {ν}+=max(0, ν). The entropy of a discrete random
variable X is denoted by H(X), and the mutual information
between random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X ;Y ).
A sequence of length n is denoted by Xn, X(k) represents
the k-th element of X , and X(l, k) the k-th element of X in
the l-th fading block.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a broadcast wiretap channel where a transmit-
ter T communicates with K legitimate receivers (R1, · · · ,RK)
in the presence of an eavesdropper E as depicted in Fig. 1.
Each terminal is equipped with a single antenna for trans-
mission and reception. The respective received signals at each
legitimate receiver Rk; k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, and the eavesdropper,
at fading block l, l=1, · · · ,L, are given by
Yk(l, j) = hk(l)X(l, j) + vk(l, j)
Ye(l, j) = he(l)X(l, j) + we(l, j),
(1)
where j=1, · · · ,κ, with κ representing the length of each
fading block, X(l, j) is the j-th transmitted symbol in the
l-th fading block, hk(l) ∈ C, he(l) ∈ C are the complex
Gaussian channel gains corresponding to each legitimate
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively, and
vk(l, j) ∈ C, we(l, j) ∈ C represent zero-mean, unit-variance
circularly symmetric white Gaussian noises at Rk and E,
respectively. We consider a block-fading channel where the
channel gains remain constant within a fading block, i.e.,
hk(κl) = hk(κl − 1) = · · · = hk(κl − κ + 1) = hk(l)
and he(κl) = he(κl − 1) = · · · = he(κl − κ + 1) = he(l).
We assume that the channel encoding and decoding frames
span a large number of fading blocks, i.e., L is large, and
that the blocks change independently from a fading block to
another. An average transmit power constraint is imposed at
the transmitter such that
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[
|X(t)|2
]
≤ Pavg, (2)
with n=κL, and where the expectation is over the input
distribution.
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Fig. 1. Broadcast wiretap channel with limited CSI feedback.
The channel gains hk and he are independent, ergodic and
stationary with bounded and continuous probability density
functions (PDFs). In the rest of this paper, we denote |hk|2
and |he|2 by γk and γe, respectively. We assume perfect
CSI at the receiving nodes. That is, each legitimate receiver
is instantaneously aware of its channel gain hk(l), and the
eavesdropper knows he(l), with l=1, · · · , L. The statistics of
the main and the eavesdropping channels are available to all
nodes. Further, we assume that the transmitter is not aware
of the instantaneous channel realizations of neither channel.
However, each legitimate receiver provides the transmitter with
b-bits CSI feedback through an error-free orthogonal channel
with limited capacity. This feedback is transmitted at the
beginning of each fading block and is also tracked by the other
legitimate receivers. The eavesdropper knows all channels and
also track the feedback links so that they are not sources of
secrecy.
The adopted feedback strategy consists on partition-
ing the main channel gain support into Q intervals
[τ1, τ2), · · · , [τq, τq+1), · · · , [τQ,∞), where Q=2b. That is,
during each fading block, each legitimate receiver Rk de-
termines in which interval, [τq, τq+1) with q=1, · · · , Q, its
channel gain γk lies and feedbacks the associated index q
to the transmitter. At the transmitter side, each feedbacked
index q corresponds to a power transmission strategy Pq
satisfying the average power constraint. We assume that all
nodes are aware of the main channel gain partition intervals
[τ1, τ2), · · · , [τq, τq+1), · · · , [τQ,∞), and of the corresponding
power transmission strategies {P1, · · · , PQ}.
The transmitter wishes to send some secret information to
the legitimate receivers. In the case of common message trans-
mission, a (2nRs , n) code consists of the following elements:
• A message set W =
{
1, 2, · · ·, 2nRs
}
with the messages
W ∈ W independent and uniformly distributed over W ;
• A stochastic encoder f : W → Xn that maps each
message w to a codeword xn ∈ Xn;
• A decoder at each legitimate receiver gk : Ynk → W
that maps a received sequence ynk ∈ Ynk to a message
wˆk ∈ W .
A rate Rs is an achievable secrecy rate if there exists a
sequence of (2nRs , n) code such that both the average error
probability at each legitimate receiver
Pek =
1
2nRs
2nRs∑
w=1
Pr
[
W 6= Wˆk
∣∣W = w] , (3)
and the leakage rate at the eavesdropper
1
n
I(W ;Y ne , h
L
e , h
L
1 , · · · , h
L
K , q
L
1 , · · · , q
L
K), (4)
go to zero as n goes to infinity. The secrecy capacity Cs
is defined as the maximum achievable secrecy rate, i.e.,
Cs , supRs, where the supremum is over all achievable se-
crecy rates. In the case of independent messages transmission,
the achievable secrecy rate tuple (R1,R2, · · · ,RK) can be
analogously defined.
III. BROADCASTING A COMMON MESSAGE
In this section, we examine the case of common message
transmission when a unique confidential information is broad-
casted to all the legitimate receivers in the presence of an
eavesdropper. Taking into account the adopted system model,
we present an upper and a lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy
capacity.
A. Main Results
Theorem 1: The common message secrecy capacity, Cs, of
a block fading broadcast channel, with an error free b-bits CSI
feedback sent by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of
each fading block, is bounded by
C−s ≤ Cs ≤ C
+
s , (5)
such as
C−s =min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Θγkτq Eγe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (6a)
and
C+s = min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Θγkτq
× E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
, (6b)
where Q=2b, {τq | 0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}Qq=1 represent the
reconstruction points describing the support of γk with
τQ+1=∞ for convenience, {Pq}Qq=1 are the power transmis-
sion strategies satisfying the average power constraint, and
Θγkτq =Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] for all q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q}.
Proof: A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the
following subsection.
It is worth mentioning that the main difference between our
bounds is that the transmission scheme, for the achievable
secrecy rate, uses the feedback information to adapt both the
rate and the power in such a way that the transmission rate
is fixed during each fading block. Also, Theorem 1 states that
even with 1-bit feedback, sent by each legitimate receiver at
the beginning of each fading block, a positive secrecy rate can
still be achieved.
Corollary 1: The common message secrecy capacity of a
block fading broadcast channel with perfect main CSIT, and
the average power constraint in (2), is given by
Cs = min
1≤k≤K
max
P (γk)
E
γk,γe
[{
log
(
1+γkP (γk)
1+γeP (γk)
)}+]
, (7)
with E[P (γk)] ≤ Pavg.
Proof: Corollary 1 results directly from the expressions
of the achievable rate in (6a) and the upper bound in (6b),
by letting Θγkτq =
1
Q
and taking into consideration that as
Q → ∞, the set of reconstruction points, {τ1, · · ·, τQ},
becomes infinite and each legitimate receiver Rk is basically
forwarding γk to the transmitter. 
To the best of our knowledge, this result has not been
reported in earlier works. For the special case of single user
transmission, the secrecy capacity in corollary 1 coincides with
the result in Theorem 2 from reference [5].
B. Ergodic Capacity Analysis
In this subsection, we establish the obtained results for the
ergodic secrecy capacity presented in the previous subsection.
1) Proof of Achievability in Theorem 1: Since the transmis-
sion is controlled by the feedbacked information, we consider
that, during each fading block, if the main channel gain of
the receiver with the weakest channel gain falls within the
interval [τq, τq+1), q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q}, the transmitter conveys the
codewords at rate Rq = log (1+τqPq) . Rate Rq changes only
periodically and is held constant over the duration interval of a
fading block. This setup guarantees that when γe>τq , the mu-
tual information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper
is upper bounded by Rq . Otherwise, this mutual information
will be log (1+γePq).
Besides, we adopt a probabilistic transmission model
where the communication is constrained by the quality of
the legitimate channels. Given the reconstruction points,
τ1<τ2< · · ·<τQ<τQ+1=∞, describing the support of each
channel gain γk; k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, and since the channel gains
of the K receivers are independent, there are M=QK different
states for the received feedback information. Each of these
states, Jm;m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, represents one subchannel. The
transmission scheme consists on transmitting an independent
codeword, on each of the M subchannels, with a fixed rate.
We define the following rates
R−s =
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τminm Pm
1+γePm
)}+]
,
and Re,m = E
γe
[log (1+γePm)] , where τminm is the quantized
channel gain corresponding to the weakest receiver in state Jm
and Pm is the associated power policy satisfying the average
power constraint.
Codebook Generation: We construct M independent code-
books C1, · · · , CM , one for each subchannel, constructed
similarly to the standard wiretap codes. Each codebook Cm
is a (n, 2nR−s ) code with 2n(R−s +Re,m) codewords randomly
partitioned into 2nR−s bins.
Encoding and Decoding: Given a particular common mes-
sage w∈{1, 2, · · ·, 2nR−s }, to be transmitted, the encoder se-
lects M codewords, one for each subchannel. More specifi-
cally, if the message to be sent is w, then for each subchannel
m, the encoder randomly selects one of the codewords Unm
from the wth bin in Cm. During each fading block, of length κ,
the transmitter experiences one of the events Jm. Depending
on the encountered channel state, the transmitter broadcasts
κRq information bits of Unm using a Gaussian codebook.
By the weak law of large numbers, when the total number
of fading blocks L is large, the entire binary sequences are
transmitted with high probability. To decode, each legitimate
receiver considers the observations corresponding to all M
subchannels. And since log
(
1+τminm Pq
)
< log (1+γkPq) is
valid for all fading blocks, the receivers can recover all code-
words, with high probability, and hence recover message w.
The expression of R−s can then be reformulated as
R−s =
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τminm Pm
1+γePm
)}+]
(8)
= min
1≤k≤K
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τk,mPm
1+γePm
)}+]
(9)
= min
1≤k≤K
M∑
m=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [Jm, τk,m=τq]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
(10)
= min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (11)
where (9) results since the logarithm function is monotonic and
the sum and the expectation are taking over positive terms, (10)
is obtained by noting that τminm ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ} and applying
the total probability theorem, and (11) comes from the fact
that
∑M
m=1 Pr [Jm, τk,m=τq] =Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1].
Since each user gets to know the feedback information of
the other legitimate receivers, our proof is also valid when the
reconstruction points {τq}Qq=1 and the transmission strategies
{Pq}
Q
q=1, associated with each legitimate receiver, are differ-
ent. That is, we can choose these quantization parameters to
satisfy (6a).
Secrecy Analysis: We need to prove that the equivocation
rate satisfies Re ≥ R−s − ǫ. Let ΓL=
{
γL1 , γ
L
2 , · · ·, γ
L
K
}
and
FL=
{
FL1 , F
L
2 , · · ·, F
L
K
}
, with Fk(l) ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ} being the
feedback information sent by receiver k in the l-th fading
block. We have
nRe = H(W |Y
n
e , γ
L
e ,Γ
L, FL) (12)
≥ I(W ;Xn|Y ne , γ
L
e ,Γ
L, FL) (13)
= H(Xn|Y ne ,γ
L
e ,Γ
L,FL)−H(Xn|Y ne ,γ
L
e ,Γ
L,FL,W ). (14)
On one hand, we can write
H(Xn|Y ne , γ
L
e ,Γ
L, FL)
=
L∑
l=1
H(Xκ(l)|Y κe (l),γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),F1(l),· · ·,FK(l)) (15)
≥
∑
l∈DL
H(Xκ(l)|Y κe (l),γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),F1(l),· · ·,FK(l)) (16)
≥
∑
l∈DL
κ
(
min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
Θγk(l)τq (Rq− log (1+γe(l)Pq))−ǫ
′
)
(17)
=
L∑
l=1
κ
(
min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
Θγk(l)τq {Rq−log(1+γe(l)Pq)}
+−ǫ′
)
(18)
= n min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
Θγkτq Eγe
[
{Rq− log (1+γePq)}
+
]
− nǫ′ (19)
= nR−s − nǫ
′, (20)
where (15) results from the memoryless property of the chan-
nel and the independence of the Xκ(l)’s, (16) is obtained by
removing all the terms corresponding to the fading blocks l 6∈
DL, with DL = ∪k∈{1,···,K} {l ∈ {1, · · ·, L} : Fk(l) > he(l)},
Θγk(l)τq =Pr [τq≤γk(l)<τq+1], and (19) follows from the ergod-
icity of the channel as L→∞.
On the other hand, using list decoding argument at
the eavesdropper side and applying Fano’s inequality [5],
1
nH(X
n|Y ne , γ
L
e ,Γ
L, FL,W ) vanishes as n→∞ and we can
write
H(Xn|Y ne , γ
L
e ,Γ
L, FL,W ) ≤ nǫ′′. (21)
Substituting (20) and (21) in (14), we get Re ≥ R−s − ǫ, with
ǫ = ǫ′ + ǫ′′, and ǫ′ and ǫ′′ are selected to be arbitrarily small.
This concludes the proof. 
2) Proof of the Upper Bound in Theorem 1: To establish the
upper bound on the common message secrecy capacity in (6b),
we start by supposing that the transmitter sends message w to
only one legitimate receiver Rk. Using the result in [20], for
single user transmission with limited CSI feedback, the secrecy
capacity of our system can be upper bounded as
Cs≤ max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Θγkτq Eγe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
,
(22)
with Θγkτq =Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1].
Since the choice of the receiver to transmit to is arbitrary, we
tighten this upper bound by choosing the legitimate receiver
Rk that minimizes this quantity, yielding
C+s = min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Θγkτq (23)
× E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
. 
IV. BROADCASTING INDEPENDENT MESSAGES
In this section, we consider the independent messages case
when multiple confidential messages are broadcasted to the
legitimate receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper. Taking
into account the adopted system model, we present an upper
and a lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy sum-capacity.
A. Main Results
Theorem 2: The secrecy sum-capacity, C˜s, of a block fading
broadcast channel, with an error free b-bits CSI feedback sent
by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of each fading
block, is bounded by
C˜−s ≤ C˜s ≤ C˜
+
s , (24)
such as
C˜−s = max
{τq;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Θγmaxτq Eγe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (25a)
and
C˜+s = max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Θγmaxτq
× E
γe,γmax
[{
log
(
1+γmaxPq
1+γePq
)}+ ∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γmax<τq+1
]
, (25b)
where γmax= max
1≤k≤K
γk, Q=2
b
, {τq | 0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}
Q
q=1
represent the reconstruction points describing the support of
γmax with τQ+1=∞ for convenience, {Pq}Qq=1 are the power
transmission strategies satisfying the average power constraint,
and Θγmaxτq =Pr [τq≤γmax<τq+1] for all q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q}.
Proof: A detailed proof of Theorem 2 is provided in the
following subsection. Theorem 2 states that even with 1-
bit feedback, sent by the strongest legitimate receiver at the
beginning of each fading block, a positive secrecy rate can
still be achieved.
Remarks:
• The presented results, for both common message and
independent messages transmissions, are also valid in the
case when multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers conduct
the attack. In the case when the eavesdroppers collude,
the results can be extended by replacing the term γe with
the squared norm of the vector of channel gains of the
colluding eavesdroppers.
• In the analyzed system, we assumed unit variance Gaus-
sian noises at all receiving nodes. The results can be eas-
ily extended to a general setup where the noise variances
are different.
Corollary 2: The secrecy sum-capacity of a block fading
broadcast channel with perfect main CSIT, and the average
power constraint in (2), is given by
C˜s = max
P (γmax)
E
γmax,γe
[{
log
(
1+γmaxP (γmax)
1+γeP (γmax)
)}+]
, (26)
with γmax=max1≤k≤K γk, and E[P (γmax)] ≤ Pavg.
Proof: Corollary 2 results directly by following a similar
reasoning as for the proof of Corollary 1. 
To the best of our knowledge, this result has not been
reported in earlier works. For the special case of single user
transmission, the secrecy sum-capacity in corollary 2 coincides
with the result in Theorem 2 from reference [5].
B. Ergodic Capacity Analysis
In this subsection, we establish the obtained results for the
ergodic secrecy sum-capacity.
1) Proof of Achievability in Theorem 2: The lower bound
on the secrecy sum-capacity, presented in (25a), is achieved
using a time division multiplexing scheme that selects periodi-
cally one receiver to transmit to. More specifically, we consider
that, during each fading block, the source only transmits to
the legitimate receiver with the highest τq , and if there are
more than one, we choose one of them randomly. Since we
are transmitting to only one legitimate receiver at a time,
the achieving coding scheme consists on using independent
standard single user Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
During each fading block, the transmitter receives K feed-
back information about the CSI of the legitimate receivers.
Since the channel gains of the K receivers are independent,
there are M=QK different states for the received feedback
information, as discussed in the proof of achievability of
Theorem 1. Each of these states, Jm;m ∈ {1, · · · ,M},
represents one subchannel. The transmission scheme consists
on sending an independent message, intended for the receiver
with the highest τq , on each of the M subchannels, with a fixed
rate. Let τmaxm be the maximum received feedback information
on channel m. The overall achievable secrecy sum-rate can be
written as
R˜−s =
M∑
m=1
Pr[Jm] E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τmaxm P (τ
max
m )
1+γeP (τmaxm )
)}+]
(27)
=
Q∑
q=1
Pr[τq≤γmax<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (28)
where (27) is obtained by using a Gaussian codebook with
power P (τmaxm ), satisfying the average power constraint, on
each subchannel m [5], and (28) follows by using the fact
that τmaxm ∈ {τ1, · · · , τQ} and rewriting the summation over
these indices. Also, we note that the probability of adapting
the transmission with τq corresponds to the probability of
having τq≤γmax<τq+1, with γmax = max1≤k≤K γk. Maxi-
mizing over the main channel gain reconstruction points τq
and the associated power transmission strategies Pq , for each
q ∈ {1, · · · , Q}, concludes the proof. 
2) Proof of the Upper Bound in Theorem 2: To prove
that C˜+s , presented in (25b), is an upper bound on the se-
crecy sum-capacity, we consider a new genie-aided channel
whose capacity upper bounds the capacity of the K-receivers
channel with limited CSI feedback. The new channel has
only one receiver that observes the output of the strongest
main channel. The output signal of the genie-aided receiver
is given by Ymax(t) = hmax(i)X(t) + v(t), at time instant
t, with hmax being the channel gain of the best legitimate
channel, i.e., |hmax|2=γmax and γmax=max1≤k≤K γk. Let
τq; q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q} be the feedback information sent by the
new receiver to the transmitter about its channel gain, i.e., τq
is feedbacked when τq≤γmax<τq+1. First, we need to prove
that the secrecy capacity of this new channel upper bounds the
secrecy sum-capacity of the K-receivers channel with limited
CSI. To this end, it is sufficient to show that if a secrecy
rate point (R1,R2, · · ·,RK) is achievable on the K-receivers
channel with limited CSI feedback, then, a secrecy sum-rate∑K
k=1Rk is achievable on the new channel.
Let (W1,W2,· · ·,WK) be the independent transmitted mes-
sages corresponding to the rates (R1,R2,· · ·,RK), and
(Wˆ1, Wˆ2, · · ·, WˆK) the decoded messages. Thus, for any ǫ>0
and n large enough, there exists a code of length n such that
Pr[Wˆk 6=Wk]≤ǫ at each of the K receivers, and
1
n
H(Wk|W1,· · ·,Wk−1,Wk+1,· · ·,WK,Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,F
L)≥Rk−ǫ, (29)
with FL={FL1 , FL2 , · · ·, FLK}, and Fk(l) ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ} is
the feedback information sent by receiver k in the l-th fad-
ing block. Now, we consider the transmission of message
W=(W1,W2,· · ·,WK) to the genie-aided receiver using the
same encoding scheme as for the K-receivers case. Adopting
a decoding scheme similar to the one used at each of the K
legitimate receivers, it is clear that the genie-aided receiver
can decode message W with a negligible probability of error,
i.e., Pr(Wˆ 6=W )≤ǫ. For the secrecy condition, we have
1
n
H(W |Y ne ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max)
=
1
n
H(W1,W2,· · ·,WK |Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max) (30)
≥
K∑
k=1
1
n
H(Wk|W1,· · ·,Wk−1,Wk+1,· · ·,WK,Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max)
(31)
≥
K∑
k=1
1
n
H(Wk|W1,· · ·,Wk−1,Wk+1,· · ·,WK,Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L)
(32)
≥
K∑
k=1
Rk−Kǫ, (33)
where FLmax={Fmax(1), · · ·, Fmax(L)} and Fmax(l) is the
feedback information sent by the genie-aided receiver in
the l-th fading block, (32) follows from the fact that
Fmax∈{F1, · · ·, FK} and that conditioning reduces the entropy,
and where (33) follows from the secrecy constraint (29).
Now, we need to prove that C˜+s upper bounds the secrecy
capacity of the genie-aided channel. Let R˜e be the equivoca-
tion rate of the new channel. We have
nR˜e = H(W |Y
n
e , γ
L
e , γ
L
max, F
L
max) (34)
= I(W;Y nmax|Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max)+H(W |Y
n
max,Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max)
(35)
≤ I(W ;Y nmax|Y
n
e , γ
L
e , γ
L
max, F
L
max)+nǫ (36)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
I(W;Ymax(l, k)|Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max, F
L
max, Y
κ(l−1)+(k−1)
max )+nǫ
(37)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Y
n
e , γ
L
e , γ
L
max, F
L
max, Y
κ(l−1)+(k−1)
max )
−H(Ymax(l, k)|W,Y
n
e ,γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max,Y
κ(l−1)+(k−1)
max )+nǫ (38)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F
l
max) (39)
−H(Ymax(l, k)|W,X(l, k),Y
n
e , γ
L
e ,γ
L
max,F
L
max,Y
κ(l−1)+(k−1)
max )+nǫ
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F
l
max) (40)
−H(Ymax(l, k)|X(l, k), Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F
l
max)+nǫ
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
I(X(l,k);Ymax(l,k)|Ye(l, k),γe(l),γmax(l),F
l
max)+nǫ
(41)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
{
I(X(l, k);Ymax(l, k)|γmax(l), F
l
max)
−I(X(l, k);Ye(l, k)|γe(l), F
l
max)
}+
+nǫ (42)
=
L∑
l=1
κ
{
I(X(l);Ymax(l)|γmax(l), F
l
max)
−I(X(l);Ye(l)|γe(l), F
l
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}+
+nǫ, (43)
where inequality (36) follows from the fact that
H(W |Y nmax, Y
n
e , γ
L
e , γ
L
max, F
L
max)≤H(W |Y
n
max, γ
L
max, F
L
max),
and Fano’s inequality H(W |Y nmax, γLmax, FLmax)≤nǫ, and (42)
holds true by selecting the appropriate value for the noise
correlation to form the Markov chain X(l)→Ymax(l)→Ye(l)
if γmax(l)>γe(l) or X(l)→Ye(l)→Ymax(l) if γmax(l)≤γe(l),
as explained in [6].
The right-hand side of (43) is maximized by a Gaussian
input. That is, taking X(l)∼CN
(
0, ω
1/2
l (F
l
max)
)
, with the
power policy ωl(F lmax) satisfying the average power constraint,
we can write
nR˜e ≤ κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)ωl(F
l
max)
1+γe(l)ωl(F lmax)
)}+]
+nǫ (44)
=κ
L∑
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E
[
E
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log
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l
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1+γe(l)ωl(F lmax)
)}+∣∣∣∣Fmax(l), γmax(l), γe(l)
]]
+nǫ
(45)
≤κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)E[ωl(F lmax)|Fmax(l),γmax(l),γe(l)]
1+γe(l)E[ωl(F lmax)|Fmax(l),γmax(l),γe(l)]
)}+]
+nǫ
(46)
= κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)Ωl(Fmax(l))
1+γe(l)Ωl(Fmax(l))
)}+]
+nǫ (47)
= κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩl(Fmax)
1+γeΩl(Fmax)
)}+]
+nǫ, (48)
where (46) is obtained using Jensen’s in-
equality, Ωl(Fmax(l)) in (47) is defined as
Ωl(Fmax(l))=E
[
ωl(F
l
max)|Fmax(l), γmax(l), γe(l)
]
, and where
(48) follows from the ergodicity and the stationarity of the
channel gains, i.e., the expectation in (47) does not depend
on the block fading index. Thus, we have
R˜e ≤
1
L
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩl(Fmax)
1+γeΩl(Fmax)
)}+]
+ǫ (49)
≤ E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩ(Fmax)
1+γeΩ(Fmax)
)}+]
+ ǫ, (50)
where (50) comes from applying Jensen’s inequality once
again, with Ω(Fmax)=
1
L
L∑
l=1
Ωl(Fmax). Maximizing over the
main channel gain reconstruction points τq and the associated
power transmission strategies Pq , for each q ∈ {1, · · · , Q},
concludes the proof. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide selected simulation results for
the case of Rayleigh fading channels with E [γe]=E [γk] =1;
k ∈ {1, · · ·,K}. Figure 2 illustrates the common message
achievable secrecy rate C−s , in nats per channel use (npcu),
with K=3 and various b-bits feedback, b=6, 4, 2, 1. The
secrecy capacity Cs, from Corollary 1, is also presented as
a benchmark. It represents the secrecy capacity with full main
CSI at the transmitter. We can see that, as the capacity of the
feedback link grows, i.e., the number of bits b increases, the
achievable rate grows toward the secrecy capacity Cs.
The independent messages transmission case is illustrated
in figure 3. Two scenarios are considered; the transmission
of three independent messages to three legitimate receivers,
K=3, and the transmission of six independent messages with
K=6. Both the achievable secrecy sum-rate C˜−s , with 4-bits
CSI feedback, and the secrecy capacity C˜s, with perfect main
CSI, are depicted. The curves are presented in npcu. From
this figure, we can see that the secrecy throughput of the
system, when broadcasting multiple messages, increases with
the number of legitimate receivers K .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we analyzed the ergodic secrecy capacity of
a broadcast block-fading wiretap channel with limited CSI
feedback. Assuming full CSI on the receivers’ side and an
average power constraint at the transmitter, we presented lower
and upper bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity and the
sum-capacity when the feedback link is limited to b bits per
fading block. The feedback bits are provided to the trans-
mitter by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of each
coherence block, through error-free public links with limited
capacity. The obtained results show that the secrecy rate when
broadcasting a common message is limited by the legitimate
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Fig. 2. Common message secrecy rate, for Rayleigh fading channels, with
K=3 and various b-bits feedback, b=6, 4, 2, 1.
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Fig. 3. Independent messages secrecy sum-rate, for Rayleigh fading channels,
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receiver having, on average, the worst main channel link, i.e.,
the legitimate receiver with the lowest average SNR. For the
independent messages case, we proved that the achievable
secrecy sum-rate is contingent on the legitimate receiver with
the best instantaneous channel link. Furthermore, we showed
that the presented bounds coincide, asymptotically, as the
capacity of the feedback links become large, i.e. b → ∞;
hence, fully characterizing the secrecy capacity and the sum-
capacity in this case. As an extension of this work, it would
be of interest to examine the behavior of the secrecy capacity
bounds in the low and the high SNR regimes. It would also
be interesting to look at the scaling laws of the system as the
number of legitimate receivers increases.
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